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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
SENATE RESOLUTION 292---SUBMISSION OF A SENATE RESOLUTION
RELATING TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN EUROPE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at
this time this country has 429 major
bases overseas and 2,297 lesser bases.
These bases cover 4,000 square miles and
are located in 30 countries. Stationed on
these bases are 1,750,000 servicemen,
families, and foreign employees, and the
cost for maintaining these bases is approximately $4.8 billion a year.
Mr. President, I would like to discuss
one area in which we have a large number of bases and an extraordinarily large
number of troops, namely, Western
Europe.
On January 19, 1967, I submitted Senate Resolution 49 which expressed the
sense of the Senate that "a substantial
resolution of U.S. forces permanently
stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve
or ability to meet our commitment
under the North Atlantic Treaty." I wish
to introduce an identical resolution
again today and ask unanimous consent
that its text be printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of my remarks and that
the resolution be referred to both the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Armed Services Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Armed Services Committee; and,
without objection, the resolution will be
printed in the RECORD.
<See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we
have had several hundred thousand men
m uniform stationed in Europe since
1951 when President Truman, respondIng to the then existing situation and to
a Senate sense resolution of that day,
announced the first substantial postWorld War II increase in U.S. forces
there. When Senate Resolution 49 was
Introduced 2 years ago there were about
372,000 military personnel in Europe, including Turkey, Spain, and the 6th Fleet
in the Mediterranean; this force was accompanied by some 240,000 dependents,
a grand total of 612,000. There are now

abouL 315.000 men- n l!uod reduct !onnnd Lhey nrc accuu1panied by :.!:!5.000
dcpendents-noL n. good enough reduction-and 14,000 civilians employed by
the U.S. Government. Thus. there are
over 550,000 Americans in Europe today
who are either in military service or associated with the military, and maintained wholly or largely by the Government of the United States.
We now have. overall, about 3.5 million men under arms. Of this total, about
1.2 million are stationed outside the
United States. according to figures provided by the Department of Defense. In
addition to those in Europe, there is a
force of about 479,500 in Vietnam.
May I say, parenthetically, that as of
last Thursday, this is 4,500 in excess of
the 60,000 announced withdrawal by the
President of the United States, a \vithdrawal which was to be met by December
15, 1969. Thus, I congratulate the President for going beyond the 60,000 mark.
I hope that this is a continuation of a
policy which, perhaps, may not be announced but which will be continued in
effect, to the end that more and more
troops can be withdrawn as appropriately
as possible from Vietnam and all of
Southeast Asia.
There are 129,000 in the fleets abroad,
58,000 in Korea, 45,000 in Thailand, 42,000 on Okinawa, another 40,000 in Japan,
28,000 in the Philippines, 24,000 in Latin
America, 10,000 in North Africa and the
Middle East, and another 10,000 in Canada, Greenland, and Iceland.
This commitment of men abroad obviously represents an enormous cost to
the people of the United States. It is reflected in a military budget of some $80
b1llion and in the tax rates. It is also
reflected in a balance-of-payments deficit
which amounted to $1.3 b1llion in the
first quarter of this year.
Our net foreign exchange gap with
Germany alone is now running at about
$965 million per annum. This is the
highest figure to date. In 1968, the figure
was $887.4 million. It had been between
$700 and $800 m!llion in the period 1963
through 1967, and under $700 million in
the years before 1963.
In the past, part of this exchange gap
has been covered through various agreements with the West German Government. In fiscal years 1962 through 1965
these so-called offset agreements consisted simply of commitments by the
West German Government to procure
military equipment in the United States.
The agreement for fiscal years 1966 and
1967 provided for military procurement
plus the prepayment of a West German
debt. The fiscal year 1968 agreement
provided for military procurement plus
purchase of special medium-term U.S.
Treasury securities by the West German
Government. In fiscal year 1969 the
agreement provided for military procurement plns the purchase of special U.S.
Treasury securities by the West German
Government, plus additional purchases
of U.S. Treasury securities by West German banks plus an agreement by Lufthansa to finance purchases of aircraft.
I have had the Library of Congress
draw up a table showing the terms of
these so-called offset agreements between
the United States and West Germany in
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fiscal yc:ns l!Hi:! LhrO\ll~h UJ69 nnd ·""
ununtmous CC'nxenL that 1t be pnntt•ci 111
the RECORD nl the conclusion of mv • ,._
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER \V1• .1 :·
objection. it is so ordered.
\See exhibit 2.>
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pre~1drn t
agreement was reached with the W c~t
German Government on July 9 coverin r•
fiscal years 1970 and 1971. The agreement
provides for an inflow of foreign exchange in the amount of $1.52 billion ovc1
the next 2 years. In addition to militarv
procurement in the United States. ih.r
agreement provides for a West German
Government loan, plus retention in the
United States for 2 years of ini('rc:-.l
earned by West Germany on U.S . Treasury deposits, plus the purchase by West
Germany of U.S. Export-Import Bank
and Marshall Plan loans, plus West German civil procurement in the United
States, plus payment to a fund in the
United States for encouraging German
investment plus advance transfers for
debt repayment by the West German
Government to the United States. A concessional interest rate of 3.5 percent will
apply to the West German Government
loan and to certain deposits In the U.S
Treasury for military procurement. I ask
unanimous consent that the text of a
press release issued by the Department
of State on July 9. giving the te1ms of the
agreement, be printed in the RECORD at
this point.
There being no objection. the press release was ordered to be printed in tlw
RECORD, as follows:
PRESS STATEMENT

The U.S. and German delegations ann o unced today the conclusion of a new agreement for offsetting foreign exchange costs of
American forces In Germany for U .S. Fiscal
Years 1970 and 1971. The delegations have
been conferring In Washington this week
on the third and concluding round of their
talks.
The agreement provides !or an Inflow of
foreign exchange to the U .S. In the amount
of 1.52 billion dollars. These Inflows will b~
achieved by $925 million of procurement of
U.S. goods and services (61% of total agreement) and $595 million of financial measures (39 % of total).
Details are as follows :
[In millions of dollars]
Military procurement In the United
States -----------------------800 U<•
Federal Republic or Germany loan
to the U.S. (repayable after ten
years) ---- - ------------------~50 ()(t
Purchase by Federal Republic or
Germany of loans held In portfolio of Eximbank a.nd of outstanding Marshall Plan loans___
1 16 7 i
Civil procurement In the United
States by Federa l Republic of
Germany ______ -----·
1 ~5 011
Creation of fund In U.S. by Feelera! Republic of Germ1ny to
encourage German lm·estmen t
In United S\a•cs__
--------150 ll"
Advance tril.nsfers by the Federal
Republic of Germany for debt
repayment to the United States_
13 7 )
Retention In the United States of
Interest earned by the Federal
Republic of Germany on US
Treasury deposi ts __ __ ___ -----32 50
Total --------------- ----- 1, 520 . 00
It was agreed that the lntere6t rate which
would apply to the Inter-government Joan
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and to certain F'ederal Republic of ~rrna.ny
deposits In the U.S. 'I'reasury !or procurement would be 3.6 percent.
The Export-Import Bank and Marshall
Plan loans purchased by tihe Federal Republlc or Germany would bea.r, on the average, a mte of interest at four percent with
respect to certain loans and tl ve percent
with respect to others.
The U.S. delegation was led by Deputy
Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Sa.muels;
the German delegation was heeded by State
Secretary Guenther Harkort of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
would like to make several comments on
the agreement. Before doing so, I should
note that the Department of State apparently believes that this agreement
represents a considerable improvement
over previous agreements. To be sure, the
amount of the military procurement is
greater than last year, or the previous
years. The borrowing by the United
States Is for a longer period than in the
past and a concessional rate will apply
to the West German Government's loan.
The total amount is higher than ever before and the agreement is for 2 years instead of only one.
In those respects there has been "improvement." It would be well to bear in
mind. however. that there is another side
of the coin. While the amount of foreign
exchange inftow involved is higher, so
is the foreign exchange gap because it
becomes more expensive every year to
keep our forces in Germany. With the
reevaluation of the Germany mark,
moreover. this expense stated in dollars
will increase again, and, possibly, more
drastically than in the past. Furthermore. the agreement represents only
about 80 percent of the foreign exchange
outflow from the United States to Germany in the coming 2 fiscal years. And,
while the West German Government
loan to the United States will carry a
concessional interest rate of 3.5 percent,
nevertheless it represents an obligation
of the United States which must be renewed or redeemed; the interest will result in some annual capital outflow and
the capital of t he loan itself must be regarded as, eventually, a large item of outflow . Finally, since the agreement is for
a 2-year period. it may imply a commitment on our part to retain substantially
the present level of U .S. forces in Germany for the next 2 years whether or
not that should prove desirable or In accord with our national needs now or a
year from now. In fact, the new West
German Chancellor said in an interview
in the Novembrr 14 issue of Time magazine that there was "an understanding
on both sides," when agreement was
reached on an offset arrangement for the
next 2 years. that there would be no
"substantial changes" in the level of U.S.
forces during this period.
No matter how the current agreement
is regarded, there is no escaping the fact
that the assignment of U.S. military
forces in Germany and Europe is a voracious consumer of U.S. resources, a
source of inflation and, in present circumstances, a factor in the reduction in
the international strength of the dollar.
It is a cliche to say that the United
States is a rich and powerful country.
After the long drain of Vietnam, how-

ever, it may be w,ise to take another look
at that glib assertion. In terms of surplus
for necessary national purposes at home
and abroad, we are beginning to scrape
the bottom of the barrel.
Other nations have come to realize
that if they are to accomplish the essential tasks at home, it may be necessary
to concentrate on only the essent.i al tasks
abroad. In my judgment, it is long past
time for us to face the facts of our situation and reach the same conclusion. In
this connection, I welcome the President's July 9 order to reduce the number
of military men based abroad by 14,900also h,is most recent order of a day or so
ago in which approximately another 14,000, almost all in the Pacific area, will
be reduced insofar as our Armed Forces
are concerned-although in my judgment it is regrettable that the reduction
is so limited and that the forces committed to NATO have been completely
exempted from this cut in military forces
overseas.
On April 15, I had printed in the REcORD the defense policy statement made
by the Canadian Prime Minister on April
3. In that statement. Prime Minister
Trudeau said:
NATO itself is continuous ly reassessing the
role It plays in the l!ght of changing world
conditions. Perhaps the major development
affecting NATO In Europe since the organization was founded is the magnificent recovery
of the economic strength of Western Europe.
There has been a very great change In t he
nb!l!ty of European countries themselves to
provide necessary conventional defense forces
and armaments to be deployed by the all!ance in Europe
It was. therefore, in our view entirely appropriate for Canada to review and re-examine the necessity In present circumstances for
maintaining Canadian forces in Western
Europe. Canadian forces are now committed
to NATO until the end of the present year.
The Canadian force commitment for d eployment with NATO In Europe beyond this
period will be discussed with our allies at the
Defense Planning Committee meeting in May.
The Canadian Government Intends, In consultation with Canada's allles, to take early
steps to bring about a planned and phased
reduction of the size of the Canadian forces
in Europe.

According to press reports, which I
understand to be accurate, the present
plan is to reduce the number of the Canadian contingent of about 10,000 in
Western Germany to about 4,000. Thls is
a small reduction in numbers but a large
reduction in percentage and would seem
to represent, in effect, a change in the
Canadian estimate of the situation in
Europe, as well as a revision of policy on
the part of the Canadian Government. I
would hope thls Nation would study the
Canadian action most carefully. To me, it
seems an adjustment which looks to the
future Instead of to the past.
Last year at this time, we, too, appeared to be on the verge of moving in
the same direction. There was widespread support in the Senate for a proposal by the distinguished Senator from
Missouri <Mr. SYMlNGTON) whlch would
have had the effect of lowering substantially the level of our forces in Europe.
Most regrettably, there was the occupation of Czechoslovakia on August 20 by
400,000 Soviet and other Warsaw Pact
forces. The time was one of extreme un-
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certainty, with various obscure troop
movements in Eastern Europe. It was far
from clear that the relatively bloodless
coup in Czechoslovakia would mark the
culmination of this activity. There was
fear that the difficulties in Eastern
Europe might spread throughout Europe.
As I stated at that time, a substantial reduction in U.S. Forces in Europe
in those circumstances could have been
subject to misinterpretation in the East,
and brought grave uncertainty in the
West. I added, however, that, in my
judgment, it remained desirable to undertake a gradual reduction in U.S . forces
if and when the situation in Easten1
Europe offered reasonable assurance that
developments there were not going to
spill over into Western Europe. It seems
to me that that time has now arrived.
The Soviet Union faces se1ious problems
in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. If that were not enough,
there is a difficult situation to the East
on the Soviet-Chinese border. Soviet
troops in Czechoslovakia, moreover, have
been cut from several hundred thousand
to about 70,000. While it is regrettable
that the internal political life of that enlightened nation is again dictated by a
foreign power, certain realities as they
bear upon our military presence in
Europe must be faced . What transpired
in Czechoslovakia was not controllable
In any fashion by NATO and bears no
direct relationship to the question of the
size of American forces assigned in Europe to that organization. Had there
been only one or two divisions or, for
that matter, seven or eight or 18 divisions of Americans in Western Germany,
instead of four or five, would they have
had any different effect on the situation
as it developed in Czechoslovakia last
year? I can find no basis for any such
contention. Events within Eastern Europe are, as they have been since the
Hungarian interlude made apparent for
all to see more than a decade ago, beyond the direct reach of t he North Atla ntic Treaty and the mili tary structure
of NATO.
Nevertheless, it will be argued. as it is
always argued, that the time is not right
to make a substantial reduction of our
forces in Europe. But it seems that the
time is never right. I am aware of the
recent press reports. for example, implying that NATO may be on the point
of makmg a proposal to the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact allie'l for negotiations on reducing conventlonal forces in
Europe. I would like to point out, however, that NATO has been studying the
subject of balanced force reductions for
years. My understanding i.; that there is
still no agreed NATO proposal for balanced force reductions and it is not
planned that there will be one until at
least early in the summer. Even then,
there is no reason to assume that discussions, much less full neJotiations. will
begin, for there has been no indication,
direct or indirect, that the Soviet Union
is interested in such discussions.
It will also be argued, as it is always
argued, that bringing a substantial number of forces back from Europe will not
affect our defense budget because we
cannot reduce the number of men under
arms. But it is also argued that it is not
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possible to reduce the number of men
under arms because of the need to meet
our NATO and other overseas commitments. This endless circle leading, in the
end, to fiscal exhaustion can and must
be broken.
I am not now advocating, and I have
not In the past advocated, that all U.S.
troops be removed from Europe. Our
vital Interest 1n what transpires in
Europe remains and a U.S. presence
should remain. In this day and age an
armed attack on Western Europe will
certainly involve us almost from the outset. It is to our interest, therefore, that
we are present before the outset. That
need can be met, In my judgment, and
should be met with a much smaller military force.
At the same time, a substantial reduction of our forces 1n Europe would have
certain immediately beneficial effects on
this Nation. In the first place, the balance
of payments should soon refiect a sharp
decrease in outfiow for military purposes,
even as It becomes possible to bring
about a reduction 1n the National military budget. In the second place, a reduction 1n U.S. forces in Western Europe
might provide some impetus for Western
Europeans to develop their own defense
efforts In line With their needs and to
work together more closely 1n doing so.
Integrated defense is supposed to be
what NATO is all about. To the extent
that we have continued to overparticipate in the defense of Europe, it follows
that there has been far less interest in
bearing the burdens of that defense
among the Europeans themselves.
Finally, a substantial reduction of
American forces would help to correct
what I regard as a distorted relationship between Europe and the United
States. The Soviet Union maintains half
a million soldiers in Eastern Europe.
Wb1le the Russians may ascribe this
presence to a threat from the West, the
fact is that the Soviet presence is also
a significant factor in maintaining communist governments in power, as Czechoslovakia has so clearly !llustrated. The
democracies have no need of U.S. forces
in order to maintain themselves within
the nations of Western Europe; yet, that
most significant political fact is cUsgulsed
by our military presence in such great
magnitude.
In my judgment, it is not a desirable
situation for a foreign power either in
Eastern Europe or Western Europe to
keep somewhere in the neighborhood of
a million men in these two camps, a quarter of a century after the events which
initially put them there. Both contingents
are somewhat anachronistic, to say the
least. Yet the continuing presence of the
one has become the principal basis for
the continuing presence of the other. The
persistence of the anachronism leads not
only to a distortion of political relationships, but to a distortion of economic
relationships. Indeed, the annual offset
negotiation with the West German Government is a case very much in point.
West Germany Is, 1n effect, becoming a
major banker for this Nation 1n order
that we may pay !or the continued llUlJ.n-

tenance of U.S. forces in Germany at
this Nation's expense.
In short, the presence of American
forces in Europe in such large numbers, in
my judgment, has vestiges, if not of
empire in a 19th century sense, then of
military occupation and of the costly cold
war and of the one-time complete preeminence of the dollar in international
finance. Yet the age of empire, the era
of occupation, the period of the cold war
and one-sided financial preeminence are
of the past. The persistence of these
vestiges in present policies involves, 1n
my judgment, a wasteful and dangerous
use of our available fiscal resources. It
acts to debilitate this Nation's capacity,
both at home and abroad, to deal with the
urgent problems of the contemporary
era.
ExHIBIT 1
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Western Germany:
1>aym(lnts
1962-1963. Mlll tary procu rement bv
Wes t Germany from the United
States ------------- __ -------- 1.375
1964-1965, Mllltary procu rement by
West Germany from the Umted
States ------ - ------ ____ ·- __ 1 3:5
1966-1967, Military procureme1.t by
West Germany from the Uruted
S t ates plus prepayment of West
German debt to the United States
in the amount of $192 million ___ I . 350
1966, Military procurement by West

Germany from the United States_

100

1966, Purchase by West Germany of

special U.S. Treasury securities___

500

Total ------------------------

600

S. RES. 292

Whereas the foreign policy and military
strength of the United States a.re dedicated
to the protection of our national security,
the preservation of the liberties of the
American people, and the maintenance of
world peace; and
Whereas the United States, in ImplementIng these principles, has maintained large
contingents of American Armed Forces In
Europe, together with air and naval units,
for twenty years; and
Whereas the security of the United States
and Its citizens remains Interwoven with
the security of other nations signatory to
the North Atlantic Treaty as it was when
the treaty was signed, but the condition of
our European allies, both economlca.lly and
militarily, has appreciably lmproyed since
lArge con tlngen ts of forces were deployed;
and
Whereas the means and capacity of all
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organlzation to provide forces to resist aggression has significantly Improved since the
original United States deployment; and
Whereas the commitment by all members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Is based upon
1ihe full cooperation of all treaty partners in
contributing materials and men on a. fair a.nct
equitable basis, but such contributions have
not been forthcoming from all other m.embers of the organization; and
Whereas relations between Eastern Europe
and Western Europe were tense when the
large contingents of United States forces
were deployed In Europe but this situation
has now undergone substantial change and
relations between the two parts of Europe
are now characterized by an Increasing
two-way flow of trade, people and other
peaceful exchange; and
Whereas the present policy of maintaining
large contingents of United States forces
and their dependents on the European Continent also contributes further to the fiscal
and monetary problems of the United States:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolv ed, Tha.t-(1) it is the sense of tlul Senate that, with
changes and improvements In the techniques
of modern warfare and because of the va&t
increase in capaoity of the Unlted States to
wage war and to move mllita.ry forces and
equipment by air, a substantial reduction of
United States forces permanently stationed
1n Europe can be made without adversely
affecting either our resolve or ability to meet
our oomm!tment under the North Atlantic
Treaty;
. (2) S. Res. 99, adopted 1n the Senate
April 4, 1951, is am.ended to contain the
provisions of this resolution and, wilere the
resolutions may oontllct, the pil"e6ent r'l60lutl.on is oonttroll!ng as to the l!enee of the
Senate.

1966, West Germany agreed that the

Bundesbank would continue Its
practice of not converting dollars
into gold.
1969, Mllltary procurement by West
Germany from the United States_
1969, Purchase by West Germany of
special U.S. Treasury sec uri ties___
1969, Purchase of U .S. Treasury securities by West German banks___
Total ------------------------

1969, Lufthansa agreed to fl.nance
$60 million purchase of aircraft in

West Germany rather than U.S.
market.

100
500
125
725

